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Sept. 1953] OAKLAND MEDICAL BLDG. CORP. tI. AUREGUY 521 
[41 C.2d 521; 261 P.2d 2491 
[So F. No. 18883. In Bank. Sept. 25, 1953.] 
OAKLAND MEDICAL BUILDING CORPORATION (a 
Corporation), Respondent, v. CARMELITA AUREGL-.y, 
as Administratrix, etc., Appellant. 
[1] Negotiable Instrument&-Defenses-Oontemporaneous Agree-
ments.-Ordinarily in absence of fraud, mistake or a lack or 
failure of consideration, a prior or contemporaneous oral 
agreement that a promissory note is not to be paid according 
to its terms constitutes no defense to an action on the note. 
[2] Id.-Evidence-Execution.-Civ. Code, § 3097, declaring that 
delivery of negotiable instrument may be shown to have been 
conditional "and not for the purpose of transferring the 
property in the instrument," means the right to set up parol 
conditions that will defeat passage of beneficial interest in 
instrument. but this does not include conditions which merely 
restrict source of payment. 
[3] Id. - Evidence - Execution.-Oral agreement between imme-
diate partieI' that promissory note is to be repaid only on 
maker's receipt of sum then owing him by a third person does 
not render delivery of note "conditional" under Civ. Code, 
§ 3097. so as to permit parol evidence of such ae:reenlent. 
[4] Id.-Want of Oonsideration: Oorporations-Disregard of Oor-
porate Entity.-If it were alleged that corporation owing 
money to maker of promissory note was alter ego of another 
corporation suing on note as payee to enforce payment thereof. 
payee wonld in effect have been paying a part of its own in-
debtednness, there would be no eonsideration for note, and it 
might also reasonably be contended that note was intended 
only as a receipt : but where defendant did not make such 
allegation, but merely that person inducing exeeution of note 
was principal stockholder of both corporations. to treat the 
two corporations as one for purposes of action would result in 
prejudicing rights of minority stoekhoJders of plllintiff cor-
poration in favor of those of other 'corporation. 
[6] Id.-Failure of OODsideration.-If maker h.tl.t executed promis-
sory note in exchange for undertaking on payee's part to collect 
[2} Parol' evidenqe, to show that bill or note was conditional. or 
given for special purpose, note, 105 A.L.R. 1346. See, also, Oal. 
Jur.2d. Bills and Notes, § 213: Am.Jur .• Bills and Notes, § 1050 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Negotiable Instruments,§ 44; [2, 31 
Negotiable Instruments, § 234; r4] Negotiable Instruments, § 23; 
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his debt from a third person for him, there would be a failure 
of consideration upon payee's failure to collect such debt; but 
where maker did not execute note in consideration of any 
wcb undertaking, but in excbange for a designated sum which 
he received, failure of third person to pay its alleged debt to 
maker does not constitute a failure of consideration. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of the 
City aud County of San Francisco. Edward Molkenbuhr, 
Judge. Affirmed. . 
Action on a promissory note. Judgment for plaintUf af-
1irmed. 
W. A. Lahanier and John F. Gallen for Appellant. 
Marcel E. Cerf, Robinson & Leland and Emmet B. Hayes 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiff brought this action against the 
administratrix of the estate of Eugene Aureguy to enforce 
payment of a negotiable promissory note for $5,000 executed 
by decedent and made payable to plaintiff. The note was 
executed on November 5, 1948, and by its terms was payable 
on February 5, 1949. Judgment was entered on the pleadings 
for plaintiff, and defendant has appealed. The only question 
presented is whether an alleged oral agreement made contem-
poraneously with the execution of the note would, if proved, 
constitute a defense to the action. Defendant's answer alleged 
the following facts. Edmund Herscher was an officer and prin-
cipal stockholder of both plaintiff and Andrew Williams Stores, 
Inc., and was the duly authorized agent of both corporations 
in their dealings with decedent. On November 5. 1948,-An-
drew Willia:!1t'l Stores owed decedent $10.000 for services ren-
dered. and "EDMUND HERSCHER, representing to said dece-
dent that he was acting on behalf of both corporations . . • 
promised and agreed that the sum of $5.000.00 would be ad. 
vanced to said decedent by the OAKLAND MEDICAL BUILDING 
CoRPORATION. to be repaid to said corporation by said decedent 
only upon receipt by said decedent of the $10.000.00 then 
owing to decedent from ANDREW WILLIAKSSTORES. INO. . . . 
[P]ursuant to said representation, promise and agreement, 
and in reliance thereon, said decedent accepted said sum of 
$5,000.00 and executed a note therefor." No part of the 
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(41 C.ld 521; 281 P.ld U8] 
[1] Ordinarily, in the absence of fraud, mistake, or a lack 
or failure of consideration, a prior or contemporaneous oral 
agreement that a promissory note is not to be payable accord-
ing to its terms constitutes no defense to an action on the 
note. (Bank of America v. Pendergrass, .. Cal.2d 258. 263 
[48 P.2d 659] ; AZameda County Title In8. Co. v. Panella, 218 
Cal. 510, 513-514 [24 P.2d 1631 : Pierce v. Avakian. 167 Cal. 
330, 332-338 [189 P. 799]: lA'IIdeman v. Coryell. 59 Cal. 
App. 788, 791-798 [212 P. 47); see, also, Estate of Gaines, 
15 Cal.2d 255, 264-265 [100 P.2d 10551: Civ. Code. § 1625; 
Code Civ. Proc., § 1856: 9 Wigmore on Evidence {3d ed.], 
§ 2444, p. 143.) [2] Defendant contends. however, that the 
alleged oral agreement in this case shows that the delivery of 
the note was conditional. Section 3097 of the Civil Code pro-
vides in part that •• As between immediate parties. and as re-
gards a remote party other than a holder in due course 
the delivery may be shown to have been conditional. or for a 
special purpose only, and not for the purpose of transferring 
the property in the instrument." The meaning of this pro-
vision was considered in McArthur v. Johmon. 216 Cal. 580 
[15 P.2d 151}. In that case the tria] court admitted parol 
evidence and found that <C '.. said note was deJivered by 
the defendant to the plaintiff upon the understandin~ and 
condition that said note was to be paid wholly and solely from 
commissions that might thereafter become due to the plaintiff 
and the defendant in connection with their joint efforts in the 
sale of real property in Imperial County, California.. ' " 
In reversing the judgment the court stated. "We are of the 
view that this finding does not brinlr into operation the above 
quoted provision of ·the statute. By the use of the phrase 
• and not for the purpose of transferring tht> property in the 
instrument' is clearly meant the ri~ht to set up by parol 
conditions that will defeat the passagt> of the beneficia] inter-
est in the instrument, but this does not include conditions 
which concede the transfpr of the property in the instrument 
and merely restrict tht> source of payment. Repeated hold-
ings of other courts may be fonnd making similar application 
of a provision of the Uniform Negotiablp Instruments Act. 
which is identical with our own statute. (5 Uniform Laws 
Annotated, Negotiable Instruments Act. § 16. p. 97.)" (216 
Cal. at 582-583; see also. Security First Nat. Bank v, Rospaw, 
107 Cal.App.2d 220, 223 [237 P.2d 76]; Van Fleet-Durkee, 
Inc. v. Oyster, 91 Cal.App.2d 411, 413 [205 P.2d 82].) 
,I 
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[8] The oral agreement pleaded in the answer in this case 
is legally indistinguishable from that in the McArthur case, 
and accordingly, could not render the delivery of the note 
conditional under section 3097. 
Defendant contends that the alleged oral agreement shows, 
either that there was no consideration for the note, or that 
the consideration has failed because the Andrew Williams 
Company has not paid the $10,000 owed by it. [4] U it 
were alleged that the Andrew Williams Company was the 
Glter ego of plaintiff, the first of these contentions would have 
merit. In such case, plaintiff would in effect have been pay-
ing a part of its own indebtedness, there would be no consider-
ation for the note, and it might also reasonably be contended 
that the note was intended only as a receipt. (See RickardsOf& 
v. Lamp, 209 Cal. 668, 670 [290 P. 14); P. A. Smith Co. v. 
MuUer, 201 Cal. 219, 222-223 (256 P. 411); BOtes v. Wylie, 
113 Cal.App.2d 243, 246-247 [248 P.2d 76] ; Cooper v. Coope,., 
8 Cal.App.2d 154, 158, 159 [39 P.2d 820] ; Allen', Collection 
Agency v. Lee, 73 Cal.App. 68, 73 [238 P. 169).) Defendant 
did not allege, however, that the Andrew Williams Company 
was plaintiff's Glter ego. She alleged only that Herscher 
was the principal stockholder of both corporations. There 
. are no allegations indicating any abuse of the separate corpo-
. rate entity privilege, and to treat the two corporations as one 
for the purposes of this action would result in prejudicing 
the . rights of the minority stockholders of plaintiff in favor 
of those of the Andrew Williams Company. 
[6] If decedent had executed the note in exchange for 
an undertaking on plaintiff's part to collect his debt from 
the Andrew Williams Company for him, there would be merit 
in the contention that the consideration has failed. In such 
ease he would not have received what he bargained for. (See 
Muir v. Hamilton, 152 Cal. 634, 636 [93 P. 857] ; Jet/erson 
v. Hewitt, 103 Cal. 624, 630 [37 P. 638] ; Harper v. Prench, 
29 Cal.App.2d 214, 216-217 [84 P.2d 216] ; Benjamin Moo,.e 
ct Co. v. O'Grady, 9 Cal.App.2d 695, 699 [50 P.2d 847].) 
Decedent did not execute the note in consideration of any 
such undertaking, however, but in exchange for $5,000, which 
he received. Under these circumstances the failure of the 
, Andrew WilliaIns Company to pay its alleged debt did not 
constitute a failure of consideration. (Lompoc Valley Bank 
v. StephensOf&, 156 Cal. 350, 351 [104 P. 449]; Seth v. Lew 
Bing, 125 Cal.App. 729, 736-737, 789-740 [14 P.2~ 637, 15 
.I 
) 
Sept. 1953] PEOPLE 1.1. V AN WINKLE. 
[4.1 C.2d 525; 261 P.2d 233J 
525 
P.2d 190] ; College Nat. Bank v. Morrison, 100 Cal.App. 403, 
407 [280 P. 218].} 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
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